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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY-A CAPTIVE
OF ITS OWN PROCEDURES
ERLE COCKE, JR.*

I. SUM ARY
The work of the Assembly is hindered by its tedious parliamentary
procedures. Its procedures should be expedited.
A thorough review of these procedures and practices has been had
only twice. Consideration of the procedures of the Main Committees
where most of the work is done has not been had since the Fourth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
The laggard work of the Assembly increases the cost, places a
great burden on the Foreign Offices of member Nations, and hinders
the Assembly's efficiently discharging its functions. These functions
have grown far beyond those originally intended, and the membership of the General Assembly in the foreseeable future will probably
increase to 100 members, thus causing further delay.
Most of the work of the General Assembly is done in its seven
Main Committees, and their work can be expedited by setting up in
a slightly different manner the agenda and procedures of these
Committees. The Session should be limited to eight weeks by
expediting the procedures of the Main Committees, by limiting statements, and by encouraging the Chairmen of the Main Committees to
act decisively.
A sequence of items should be set up for consideration and a target
date should be announced by the Chairman after consultation with
the Secretariat, and the list of speakers on each item should be closed
at the end of the first day of consideration of each agenda item. If
the list of speakers were scheduled, debate would be continuous until
ended. The Chairman should suggest a time limit on speakers in
general debate and on resolutions, and these with amendments should
not be mimeographed and distributed until the end of the general
debate.
Explanations of how and why certain votes were cast or would be
cast should be extended in the record instead of the Assembly's time
being consumed in listening to their oral presentation. Reasons,
recommendations and authorities follow this summary.
* Member, United States Delegation to the Fourteenth United Nations General Assembly.
1. The author expresses his thanks to Hon. James W. Barco, Minister and
Counselor of Mission, United States Mission to the United Nations; Hon.
Granville S. Ridley, Former Special Justice, Supreme Court of Tennessee;
and Ernest L. Kerley, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, for,
reading the manuscript of this article and making helpful suggestions.
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II. THE PROBLEM DEFnm
In reporting to the President on the work of the United States
Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius described the responsibility of the United Nations
General Assembly as the performance of "the healthful and ventilating functions of a free deliberative body, without the right or duty
to enact or legislate." 2 A parliamentary body meeting that description
would be a unique one. Whether or not the General Assembly fully
meets that description today, the uniqueness, even to those familiar
with American legislative bodies, is indisputable. As a member of the
United States Delegation to the Fourteenth General Assembly, I was
privileged to carry out, and sometimes to help make, United States
policies in the United Nations. This was at once a reassuring and a
frustrating experience. By and large, I found the men and women
who walk the corridors of the United Nations Headquarters to be
intelligent, dedicated persons, but I think their work is often hindered,
prolonged or made tedious by parliamentary practices which would
not be followed in legislative bodies throughout the world. Granted
the General Assembly is unique, it is not a legislature; I think its
procedures, even by the standards of its own functions and objectives,
are not as expeditious as they could and should be.
Since the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly were adopted
at the Second Session on November 17, 1947,3 studies have twice been
made in an effort to expedite the work of the Assembly. At the
Fourth Session the General Assembly approved a number of changes
in the practice, and in the Rules of Procedure, which had been proposed by a Special Committee on Methods and Procedures appointed
by it at the previous session. 4 At the Seventh Session the General
Assembly further revised its practices both with regard to the handling of legal and drafting questions5 and with regard to limitation of
the length of its sessions. 6 Other amendments of a less fundamental
character have also been made from time to time. A comprehensive
consideration of the procedures followed within the Main Committees,
where most of the work of the General Assembly is done, has not
been undertaken since the Fourth Session.
In 1958, the General Assembly met from September 16 to December 13, a total of twelve and a half weeks, and adopted 109 resolutions.
The texts of all resolutions adopted have been printed in 58 doublecolumn pages. 7 By contrast, the United States Congress during its
2. U. S. Dept. of State Publ.No. 2349, Charter of the United Nations. Report
to the President of the Results of the San Francisco Conference 14 (1945).
3. Res. 173(H1), U.N. Doc. No. A/519 at 104-5 (1947).
4. Res. 362 (IV), U.N. Doc. No. A/1251 at 59-63 (1949).
5. Res. 684 (VII), U.N. Doc. No. A/2361 at 61-62 (1952).
6. Res. 689B (VII), U.N. Doc. No. A/2361 at 63-64 (1952).
7. U.N. Doc. No. A/4090 (1958).
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1958 session, a period of 231 days, adopted a number of private bills
as well as statutes and proclamations totalling 1792 pages. 8 - In 1958
the New York Legislature adopted 992 statutes of a total length of
2375 pages during a session of 77 days; 9 in 1958 the Legislature of
Georgia adopted statutes of a total length of 717 pages10 during a:
session of 40 days.
Obviously, these statistics give the merest approximation of comparative efficiency in the case of parliamentary bodies of such diverse
mission, composition and function. An uncritical quantitative evaluation would be absurd under these circumstances. The figures are
cited merely for what support they may provide for my previously
stated personal impressions.
Several liabilities arise from the undue prolongation of General
Assembly Sessions. In addition to the expenses common to all large
parliamentary groups, extra costs are involved in General Assembly
meetings because they are multilingual. Simultanous translations
during the meetings and preparation of records and documents in
several languages" requires a staff of translators and interpreters to
attend each meeting and to prepare the records and documents. The
cost of a three hour Committee meeting has been estimated at
$6,000.00.
Moreover, a protracted General Assembly session places an undue
burden on the Foreigr Offices of Member States. For senior Foreign
Office personnel and their most able subordinates to be away from
their desks for a twelve weeks period necessarily reduces the effectiveness of the foreign policy of many Members in topics not connected with the United Nations. Only a few Member States have a
sufficient quantity of "top-rank" Foreign Office personnel to avoid
this problem; the others must either suffer impairment of their Foreign Office operations during Assembly sessions, or put less able
officers on their delegations to the United Nations, or interrupt the
operation of their delegations by sending personnel for only part
of a session.
But the most important consideration raised by the cumbersome
procedures of the General Assembly is neither the expense nor the
burden which prolonged sessions place on the Foreign Offices of
8. 72 Stat. pt. 1 (1958).
9. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1958.
10. Ga. Laws 1958.
11. Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish are the official languages
of the United Nations; English, French and Spanish are the working languages.
Rule 51, Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. No. A/3660
at 10 (Sales No. 1957.1.24) (1957). All statements at meetings are translated
into the working languages. Rules 52, 53, 54, Ibid. Verbatim records of meetings are prepared in the working languages. Rule 55, Ibid. Summary records
of meetings and documents are available in the official languages. Rules 56,
58. Id. at 10-11.
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Member States; it is the limitation which these practices impose on
the capacity of the Assembly for the effective discharge of its functions. However accurately the quoted statement of Secretary of State
Stettinius may have described the functions of the projected General
Assembly in 1945, it is clear that the role of the Assembly today is
much more than mere free deliberation. For a decade and a half the
United Nations has been confronted with a Security Council paralyzed
by the Soviet abuse of the veto power. This has resulted not only in
the formal assumption by the Assembly of functions assigned by the
Charter to the Security Council,' 2 but also in a more specific and
political approach on the part of the Assembly than appears originally
to have been intended. Moreover, the General Assembly has grown
year by year to a present size of eighty-two Members; as new, independent states emerge in the once "colonial" areas of the world, a
membership of one hundred can be forseen. Efficient procedure in the
General Assembly is necessary, therefore, merely to maintain its
present effectiveness; in addition, it is highly desirable that it be
capable of assuming new activities should we conclude that it would
promote the maintenance of peace and security for the General Assembly to do so.
Before considering further the procedures of the General Assembly,
let us look briefly at its structure. The Assembly is composed of representatives of all Member States, each having one vote. It decides

questions by a simple majority of the members present and voting,
or, in the relatively infrequent case of certain questions deemed
"important questions," by a two-thirds majority. 13 The Assembly has
12. E.g., Res. 377A(V), "Uniting for Peace," U.N. Doc. No. A/1775 at 10-11
(1950). This resolution provides for the calling of a special session of the
General Assembly when the veto prevents Security Council action for the
maintenance of peace and security and sets up a commission to investigate at
the scene of international tension. Its rationale is evident in the following
excerpts from the preamble:
"The GeneralAssembly,

;'Findingthat international tension exists on a dangerous scale
"Reaffirming the importance of the exercise of by the Security Council
of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity
and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,
"Conscious that the failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities . . . does not relieve member states of their obligations
or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain
international peace and security.
"Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the
Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security.... "
13. Rules 84-87, U.N. Doc. No. A/3660 at 15 (Sales No.: 157.1.24) (1957).
See Kerley, Voting on Important Questions in the United Nations General
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appointed seven Main Committees, each with a given area of competence. In defining these areas of competence, Rule 101 of the Rules
of Procedure of the General Assembly provides as follows:
The Main Committees of the General Assembly are:
(a) Political and Security Committee (including the regulation
of armaments) (First Committee);
(b) Special Political Committee;
(c) Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee);
(d) Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee);
(e) Trusteeship Committee (including Non-Self-Governing Territories) (Fourth Committee);
(f) Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee);
(g) Legal Committee (Sixth Committee) 14
The Main Committees, like the General Assembly in plenary session,
are composed of representatives of all Member States; decisions are
taken by a simple majority. 15
Most of the work of the General Assembly is done in the Main
Committees. Agenda items are assigned to the various Committees
by the General Assembly in plenary session at the beginning of each
session. While the Main Committees are considering the agenda
items assigned to them, and determining resolutions which will be
proposed to the plenum for adoption, the plenum does not meet, or
meets to hear general statements directed to the matters before the
General Assembly as a whole. Late in the session, the Main Committees report to the plenum regarding the items on their agenda,
proposing one or more resolutions on each item. Since the representation in the Main Committees and the plenum is identical, the
adoption of a resolution in committee foretells its adoption in the
plenum except in cases where further negotiations have led to a
change in the position of delegations, or where a different voting
majority is required. As a result, debate in the plenum is often brief
or nonexistent; an agenda item which consumed a number of committee meetings may be disposed of in a few minutes in the plenum.
Thus, efforts to expedite the work of the Assembly should concentrate
mainly on the operation of the Main Committees.
III. COMPLICATING FACTORS

Several aspects of the General Assembly are in part responsible for
its present slow pace. These would have to be taken into account in
Assembly, 53 Avi. J. INT'L L. 324 (1959).
14. U.N. Doc. No. A/3660 at 18 (Sales No.: 1957.1.24) (1957).
15. Rule 126, id. at 22. An exception to this requirement is made in the case
of decisions to reconsider proposals after adoption or rejection, which requires
a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Rule 124, ibid.
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considering any corrective measures. In the first place, the very functions of the United Nations are incompatible with the expedition
sought in domestic legislatures. The practices of every legislative body
arises from the interplay between two considerations: (1) The
representatives in such bodies need to satisfy the desires of their
constituents for a full exposition of their views in problems especially
important to them; and (2) In order to attend to all questions on the
agenda in a limited period of time a legislative body must curb
discussion. It is inherent in one of the basic purposes of the United
Nations-to maintain international peace and security-that predominant weight must be given to the first consideration. In the present
state of international organization, the restraints against armed conflict are far from decisive. The limited resources of the United Nations are frequently hard put to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.
One of the most important contributions of the United Nations to the
maintenance of peace is the reduction of domestic political pressures
which might otherwise force national leaders to take actions they
realize endanger the maintenance of peace. The ability of national
leaders to satisfy their excited public that "something is being done"
about a problem in the United Nations may enable those leaders to
avoid more inflammatory actions. It is precisely because some debates
in the United Nations assume the aspect of a cause cdlZbre that the
partisans in a Member State can be satisfied merely by the adoption
of a favorable resolution. For this reason, a reduction of the debate,
especially by the limitation of the length of statements, might be a
serious mistake in some situations. However, not every issue before
the United Nations is of great political intensity; nor is it necessary
in even the more heated political questions that all delegations be
permitted to make long speeches.
A second cause of delay is the relatively low degree of informal
organization within the General Assembly. Except for the Communist bloc, whose uniformity of voting often betrays its members'
pretensions of independence, there are no organized political parties,
in the domestic sense, within the General Assembly. Regional groups
caucus from time to time in an effort to reach agreed positions on
questions of common interest. These caucuses are quite often successful in agreeing on candidates for office; they are much less successful in agreeing on other issues. On "security" issues the Free
World delegations can usually agree on substance and tactics, but
even this relatively informal arrangement does not exist on all issues
in the political committees, nor does it extend to the technical committees. The political party as we know it, an established organization taking decisions on all or most issues, and enforcing those
decisions on its members by threat of party discipline, is not com-
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patible with the attitude of representatives of Member-States in
the General Assembly, and with the conceptions of national inde-

pendence and national status held by those representatives.
A result of this lack of party structure is that there is little submerging of individual positions, along the lines of a caucus decision,
in the consideration of most issues in the General Assembly. Rather
than being fixed in advance, the positions of delegates gradually become known during the course of debate and in discussions among
delegates in the corridors. These positions may change as the debate
progresses, according to the delegates' estimates of voting strength.
This is especially true in the not infrequent case of those delegations
which are not concerned with the substance of the question under
discussion, and which consequently respond readily to political considerations. As a result, the action to be taken by the Committees
tends to "develop" during the course of debate; even the most
energetic canvassing early in the debate might produce a misleading
estimate of the probable decision of the Committee.
It does not seem that this characteristic can be avoided at the
present stage of organization of the international community. Decisions will probably continue to "develop" during the course of the
debate for many years to come. However, this does not mean that the
debate cannot be organized and expedited. Here there is ample room
for improvement.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that committee chairmen of the
General Assembly are, as a rule, less likely to exercise vigorously
the powers of the chair than are comparable officers of domestic
legislative bodies. Rule 105 of the Rules of Procedure provides:
"Each committee shall elect its own Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
Repporteur. These officers shall be elected on the basis of equitable
geographical distribution, experience and personal competence. These
16
elections shall be held by secret ballot."'
Thus, chairmen in the General Assembly do not acquire office
through seniority, and, once acquiring it, hold it until retirement or a
change of administration, as is the case in domestic legislative bodies.
They hold office for a single session, and are naturally disinclined to
initiate practices as chairmen which would prove frustrating to them
when they return to the ranks of the committee. Of course, there are
exceptions, but the usual practice in the General Assembly is for the
chairmen to preside less firmly and decisively than their experience
and ability would enable them to do. It should be emphasized that
the problem here is not the abilities of the chairmen, since the usual
practice is for a state to appoint a relatively senior person to represent it in a committee where it is to receive a chairmanship; on the
16. Id. at 19.
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contrary, the problem is that the chairman is by established practice
not expected to preside decisively. While it is possible that this
attitude could be altered, so long as it exists expedition must be
sought elsewhere than merely by giving additional powers to the
chairman.

IV. A PROPOSAL
From what has been said it is obvious that I believe it is time for
the General Assembly to review its procedures. On much of its work
the General Assembly is spending more time and money than it needs
to, more than it should. This review of its procedures should be
undertaken in the General Assembly at its next session. Since revision
of the Rules of Procedure would be involved in many cases, it would
seem appropriate that this study be undertaken in the Legal Committee. It is not realistic to expect that Assembly procedures should
be brought at this time to a degree of dispatch comparable with our
domestic legislatures. The composition and structure of the United
Nations renders this an unlikely attainment; the function of the Organization makes it an undesirable one. But a session of eight weeks
duration is an attainable and yet commendable objective. Once it
has been achieved, there will be time enough to consider whether
further reductions can and should be made.
The study of this question should base its work on three premises:
(1) Expedition can most effectively be sought in the practices of the
Main Committees; (2) While exerting pressure in the direction of
shortened and more expeditious statements, the changes should not
preclude or unduly complicate the holding of protracted debate when
the political aspects of an agenda item require it; (3) While new
functions may be given to the chairmen of the committees, those
whose exercise would require great firmness or decisiveness should
be avoided as unlikely to achieve the result sought. There follows a
set of specific proposals which illustrate the approach that I think
should be followed in this study, and which have, in my opinion,
sufficient provisional validity to justify their being considered in
such a study.
A. Sequence of Items
At present, the usual practice in the Main Committees in accordance with Rule 100,17 is to debate, as the initial question following
the election of committee officers, the sequence in which the agenda
17. 'Each Main Committee, taking into account the closing date for the
session fixed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the General
Committee, shall adopt its own priorities and meet as may be necessary to
complete the consideration of the items referred to it." Id. at 18. This rule is
itself a part of an earlier effort to expedite the work of the Assembly; it was
one of the rules adopted by the General Assembly by Resolution 363 (IV).
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items should be considered. On occasion this debate extends to several
meetings. It is not the practice to fix, at the outset, a target date for
the conclusion of each item; this is sometimes done by the chairman
informally later in the session.
The debate on the sequence of items could be shortened materially
if it were to be held on the basis of a specific recommendation by the
chairman. This recommendation would be preceded by consultation
between the chairman and the Secretariat, and would include both
the sequence of items and the target dates for their conclusion. The
consultation between the chairman and the Secretariat could take
place during the several days which usually intervene between the
election of the chairman and the first deliberative meeting of the
Committee, and would be preceded by consultation between the
Secretariat and delegations which might work out an agreed sequence
of items, just as the question of officers is worked out now. If no
agreed sequence of items was possible, a recommendation in the
alternative might be made, with a resultant clarification of interest
so that a decision on the sequence of items would be expedited. The
fixing of target dates would also be done on the basis of consultation
by the Secretariat. Even though these dates might have to be revised
during the session, the consultation would serve to reveal potentially
time-consuming items, and the target dates would prevent committee
lethargy during the early part of its session.
B. List of Speakers
The usual practice in the Main Committees pursuant to Rule 116,18
is to defer closing the list of delegates wishing to speak on an agenda
item for several meetings after the initiation of discussion. Often
several meetings are consumed in desultory debate before the list of
speakers is closed. Consideration might be given to revising Rule
116 to provide that the list of speakers should be closed at the end
of the first day after the beginning of the consideration of a new
agenda item. It would appear unwise, however, to close it any earlier
than that. Many delegations are not large enough to cover all concurrent committee meetings. Thus, if the speakers list were closed at
the end of the first day of debate on an agenda item, some delegations
might be unaware that consideration of the item had begun until
after the time for going on the speakers list had passed. However, the
Journal of the General Assembly, a daily publication listing the
meetings and events scheduled for the day, contains a summary of the
action in each committee and the Assembly on the preceding meeting
18. "During the course of a debate, the Chairman may announce the list of
speakers and, with the consent of the committee, declare the list closed. He
may, however, accord the right of reply to any member if a speech delivered
after he declared the list closed makes this desirable." Id. at 20.
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day. Thus, a delegate can be aware at the beginning of an agenda
item in a committee he has not attended by reading the Journal for
the following day, and has the opportunity to inscribe himself on the
speakers list at that time. To provide for the closing of the speakers
list at the end of the day after the beginning of discussion on a new
agenda item would impose on delegations no other obligation than
that of reading the Journal each morning; this is not too high a price
to pay for expedition.
An additional change of procedure of even greater effectiveness
would involve merely a strict construction of Rule 116, which refers
to a list, rather than a schedule, of speakers. The present practice
is to permit delegates to inscribe themselves on the speakers list
for a specific day or meeting. As a result, meetings may be called
off, or adjourned early, merely because no, or just a few speakers,
are scheduled to speak at that meeting. The waste of time arising
from this practice is substantial, especially during the first meetings
on a new item. This waste could be corrected by permitting delegates
to indicate merely the order in which they wish to speak. No change
in the Rules of Procedure would be required; such a procedure is
already implied in Rule 116, and in Rule 111 which provides that
"the chairman shall call upon speakers in the order in which they
signify their desire to speak."'19 As an aid to small delegations, the
speakers remaining on the list at the end of each meeting might be
included in the report of that meeting in the Journal of the next day.
C. Time Limit of Speeches
While the regular use of the power granted the chairman by Rule
11520 to limit the length of statements could do much to expedite the
work of the Assembly, in practice it is rarely used. The limitation is
cast as an extraordinary measure, and courtesy thus limits its use.
Statements in the Committees are often of unnecessary, and sometimes of excessive, length. Moreover, some delegates frequently
speak more than once during the general debate on an issue. While
it would be possible to revise Rule 115 to fix a time limit-say 20
minutes-for statements in the general debate, with a shorter limitsay 10 minutes-for statements on the resolutions once introduced and
for the exercise of the right of reply granted by Rule 116, it seems
unadvisable to do so. The length of time needed for a complete but
concise statement necessarily varies with the complexity of the item
being considered. Better procedure would be to leave Rule 115 as it
19. Id. at 21.
20. "Thq committee may limit the time to be allowed to each speaker and
the number of times each representative may speak on any question. When
the debate is limited and a representative has spoken his allotted time, the
Chairman shall call him to order without delay." Id. at 20.
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is now drafted, but to recommend a practice whereby the Chairman
would propose to the Committee a time limit at the beginning of
debate on each new item. This would allow the time limit to vary
with the question under discussion, and would take allowance of the
occasional case where it may be advisable, for the reasons indicated
earlier, to have no time limit. In any case, it should be recognized
that the Committee may, on request of a speaker, extend the time
limit. This might well be necessary to recognize the special interests
of some states in an agenda item even when the Committee considered it advisable not to extend the time limit generally.
It is obvious that this change would not preclude long statements.
In terms of necessary effect, there is no difference between giving
the Committee the right to impose a time limit and imposing a time
limit but giving the Committee the right to extend it. In either case,
the determining factor is the will of the Committee. But the emphasis
is different in the two cases. If the time limit were automatically
proposed at the beginning of debate on an item, most speakers would
be prepared to conform to it merely because of the pressure in any
body to meet norms of conduct which have been stated. Moreover,
the regular use of time limits would do much to change the present
conception of the time limit as an unusual or extreme measure.
D. Introduction of Proposals
As has been indicated, items in Committees are considered first in
a general debate, during which positions are stated; following that is
held a debate on the specific proposals and amendments thereto introduced by the members of the Committee. This latter stage culminates in the adoption of one or more resolutions expressing the
views of a majority of the Committee.
The present practice is that proposed resolutions, and amendments
to them, are mimeographed by the Secretariat and distributed as
Committee documents as soon as submitted, whether or not the
general debate has concluded. Contrary to what might be expected,
the distribution of proposals and amendments before the end of the
general debate on an item may delay, rather than expedite, the
work of the committee because it leads to hasty draftmanship and
inadequately considered proposals, and because such proposals are
necessarily submitted while the positions in the committee are still
developing, since the general debate is not yet complete.
For these reasons consideration should be given to the question
whether the work of the committees might not be expedited if the
Committee Secretariat were to hold proposals and resolutions until
the end of the general debate, and to distribute them in the committee concurrently with a statement of explanation by their sponsors.
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Such a change could be done by an addition to Rule 121,21 which
concerns proposals and amendments, or merely by a revision in the
practice followed.
E. Explanation of Votes
Following a vote, a considerable period, sometimes more than a
single meeting, is consumed by explanations of delegates as to the
reason how and why they will vote or have voted. Such statements
are permitted by Rule 124.22 Unless these statements are intended
to influence the vote of other delegations, in which case they obviously
repeat arguments which could have been made during the debate,
they serve no purpose but to record how23 and why a delegation
voted as it did.
The practice of extension of remarks for the record, in which a
legislator may insert in the record a statement not actually given on
the floor, is common in domestic legislatures. In its full form it would
probably not be acceptable to delegates at the present stage of the
parliamentary development of the General Assembly. However, I
submit that this practice would not be too drastic in connection with
the explanation of votes. Consideration should therefore be given
to the revision of Rule 129 to provide that, at the conclusion of voting,
delegates should be given permission to file with the Secretariat, a
written statement of limited length explaining their vote. These
statements would then be appended to the record of the meeting at
which the voting occurred.
V.

CONCLUSION

It has been the burden of this article that the procedure in the
United Nations General Assembly is more cumbersome, and thus
more wasteful of the time and resources of the Organization, than it
needs to be. A study of ways to expedite the work of the Assembly,
with emphasis on the operations of the committees, should be undertaken at the next session. The specific suggestions made seem worthy
of inclusion in such a study, and, in any event, serve to illustrate the
type of proposal which is, in my view, most likely to be useful.
21. Ibid.

22. "After the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion
with the actual conduct of the voting. The Chairman may permit members to
explain their votes, either before or after the voting, except when the vote
is taken by secret ballot The Chairman may limit the time to be allowed
for such explanations. The Chairman shall not permit the proposer of a
proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or
amendment." Id. at 23.
23. In cases where the voting is taken, pursuant to Rule 128, by roll-call
rather than by show of hands, even this purpose would not be present, since
the record would show how each delegation had voted.

